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Conference co-organizer Harold Trinkunas welcomes panelists and attendees.  
Introduction 
The Naval Postgraduate School hosted a conference on Terrorism Financing and State 
Responses in Comparative Perspective in Monterey, California on November 4-5, 2004. The 
conference took stock of what has been learned about terrorist finances as well as various 
government responses as part of the continuing global war on terror. Over 90 participants spent 
the two days immersed in thoughtful discussion, and at times vigorous policy debate, of the 
varying methods by which states may respond to—and seek to mitigate the effects of—terrorist 
organizations using measures designed to disrupt their access to funds—including monitoring, 
tracking, freezing, and regulating suspect funding, and closing off channels long used by terror 
organizations for the transfer of operational funds.  
Panelists presented of a broad selection of policy ideas and shared their insights and critical 
analysis on this financial dimension of the global war on terror. Audience participation was 
encouraged through frequent question and answer periods, and the diverse selection of speakers 
from academia (with institutions such as NPS, the Monterey Institute, Stanford, Northeastern, 
American University, University of Pittsburgh, and University of Wollongong represented), and 
government (including the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and 
Congressional Research Service), and including regional experts (representing Australia, 
Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Latin America) contributing a variety of perspectives. This 
variety of perspectives kept participants on their toes throughout the conference, as they became 
engaged by the conference's diverse viewpoints.  
 
Panelist Surinder Rana and NPS instructor Izumi Wakugawa prepare for registration. 
Day One—Thursday, November 4, 2004 
Department of National Security Affairs Assistant Professor Harold Trinkunas—who co-organized 
the conference with colleague Jeanne Giraldo—welcomed participants to the conference, noting 
the great turnout and saying he was looking forward to participants' questions and comments. He 
explained an important goal of the conference was looking to the application, down the road, of 
the ideas discussed during the conference. Trinkunas recalled that when Jeanne Giraldo and he 
first started organizing this conference, it was three years after 9/11, and really time to take stock 
of what we know. He noted that a lot of what we know about terrorism predates 9/11, and added, 
That's part of what this project is about.  
Trinkunas went on to explain there were three fundamental areas of inquiry we have as part of 
this project, around each of which there would be panelists presenting conference papers. First, 
Terrorism Financing—how it's done, some of strengths of terrorist groups as they do this, and 
their inefficiencies; those are some of the questions we'd like to get at. Second, Governments—
how do governments respond to this threat; why do some governments succeed, some fail—and 
how does this vary around the regions of the world. The third question, Trinkunas noted, and one 
of the hardest ones to deal with—is: how do we know what we know is true? This is true for all 
academic inquiries, but especially important when it comes to terrorism financing. There's a lot of 
the information available, but we aren't sure how good the data is. He added, that's one of the 
things we want to talk about in this conference. With that, he noted it was time for the first panel. 
Panel I: Terrorism Financing—Methods & Organizational Dynamics  
1. Jacob Shapiro, Stanford University—The Greedy Terrorist 
Starting off the first panel was Stanford University graduate student and Organizational Learning 
Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation Jacob Shapiro, who presented his 
paper titled The Greedy Terrorist, which talks about ways of thinking about terrorist organizations' 
finances—and why they are the way there are, and not sometimes what we think they are. To 
help set the scene he presented a quotation those nit-picks on expenditures as low as $1,573 
from Ayman Al-Zawahiri, second in command of al Qaeda. He follows that with a second quote, 
from a disillusioned Kashmiri separatist who was interviewed by Jessica Stern, who described his 
terror movement as akin to running a business using poor and illiterate boys—and who was 
disillusioned with the way he saw his leaders behaving in the jihad. According to Shapiro, current 
theoretical work out there makes several assumptions about terrorist groups—such as their ability 
to efficiently distribute funds, raise funds from variety of source, operate secretly/covertly, as a 
network of cells, and to keep things going. The literature also assumes cell members all agree on 
how to achieve their costs—something Shapiro questions, but pointed out there are well 
documented disagreements on strategy and tactics among terrorists, including whether to make 
peace with government. Shapiro identifies five sources of terror funds: direct contributions from 
individuals; intentional donations from charitable foundations; state sponsorship; profits from 
legitimate businesses; and profits from criminal enterprises.  
In contrast to the assumptions underlying much of the literature, there is great variation in the 
commitment of members of terror organizations. Shapiro explained there is a natural adverse 
selection process with opportunities to participate in a dangerous and risky adventure drawing 
those most committed to participate in risky causes, and the result is along the trajectory of a 
terrorist's career progression one would expect commitment to shrink in the middle ranks. 
Shapiro's intuition is if members are recruited into the positions from a limited population, then the 
more committed people are placed in a more risky role, and the less committed people are placed 
in financial and logistical roles. This opens terror organizations up to risks associated with the 
moral hazard problem. Shapiro considers, what are the strategies leaders can use to deal with 
this to solve this moral hazard problem? One method is auditing, but Shapiro notes that the very 
act of auditing will create vulnerability, and a create paper trail that government can track. Shapiro 
also notes terror planners can provide funds on a need-to-have-basis and points out that this is 
how the embassy bombings were financed but adds this entails additional communication, and so 
there is a security cost. And a punishing strategy would depend on catching the agent, and the 
ability to punish but Shapiro notes it's sometimes hard for principles to catch what agents are 
doing and when they do, punishment is problematic since logisticians/financiers often operate in 
areas separate from where organizations have military power. Incentive-based contracts can also 
help solve the moral hazard problem. Another method is to screen out candidates/agents who 
seem uncommitted, using an ideological discussion. However, Shapiro observes that ideological 
purity may result in fewer capable people. Lastly, Shapiro notes terrorist leaders may encourage 
members of their financial networks to enter into 'trust-inducing relationships' like marriage, since 
these relationships will significantly raise the cost of shirking  
Shapiro discusses ways governments may exploit the vulnerabilities of terrorist organizations and 
their financial networks. One method is to target communal links and the trust-inducing 
relationships that define a community, making such relationships riskier. If governments make it 
known to terrorists that we are going to surveil community and family ties, this will raise the 
perception of the cost of their strategy and take away the efficiency of their organizations. Another 
method is to freeze the funds of terrorist organizations—but Shapiro suggests governments 
should not publicize such efforts since agents can use this as an excuse to explain away missing 
funds; but if not publicized, the agent must then explain to the principle why funds were lost. And 
lastly, Shapiro discussed government efforts to boost economic development in areas that are 
home to terrorist fundraising activity, and thus create alternatives for members of terror financial 
networks. At the very least, this will increase the cost of terror principals, who will have to offer 
more competitive compensation than in a less developed region. But Shapiro advised, don't 
target areas which are substantial recruiting areas since this will create more noise behind which 
terror financing can be shielded. Shapiro explained there is a security/efficiency trade-off which 
governments can exploit—but added that countermeasures such as regional economic 
development may have unintended consequences.  
 
Conference participants enjoy a lively coffee break between panels.  
2. John Picarelli, American University—Transnational Crime and Corruption Center 
(TraCCC) 
American University's John Picarelli took a look at the convergence and divergence of organized 
crime and terrorism in his paper, Organized Crime and Terrorism, which examined some of the 
linkages between these two groups, and the nexus where organized crime and terror overlap. 
Picarelli has found this nexus between organized crime and terrorism is more a transactional one, 
more market-based, and not actor-based reflecting an alignment of pragmatic short term interests 
but which do not suggest a more permanent long term alignment. As terrorists engage in crime, 
they provide authorities with another avenue for interdictions and intelligence collection. Terrorists 
engage in organized crime, first and foremost, for financial gain: Think of terror financing as a 
portfolio, from which you can earn money from a variety of ways—charities, etc, and crime is just 
one other way.  
Picarelli presented a table of all the criminal activities that terrorist groups have engaged in—
narcotics smuggling, commodity smuggling, goods smuggling, migrant smuggling, trafficking in 
persons, extortion, kidnapping, intellectual property theft, counterfeiting, fraud, credit theft and 
armed robbery. Picarelli made some policy recommendations based on his findings—first among 
which is to increase the cost for entry, since these barriers to engaging in crime present an 
opportunity for governments for increasing risk, increasing cost to entry through the injection of 
risk. As well, governments should foster mistrust within and between organized crime and 
terrorist groups, and to use trust as a mechanism to leverage organized crime's cooperation, as 
older organized crime families have long ties to the very states that terrorists seek to overthrow. 
Criminal activity provides authorities with a potential tracking source for a terrorist cell's 
intentions—and while corruption is often said to be a cause of terror, Picarelli noted that it is also 
a tactic used by terrorist groups.  
With regard to external alliances between terror groups and organized crime, Picarelli sees no 
long term connection—though there are outsourcing relationships that exist, albeit these are seen 
more in the arena of logistical crime as opposed to financial that come together for a transaction 
or series of actions and then go away. Picarelli highlighted two recommendations in particular: 
first, he advocated increased use of regional training, noting training is something that is 
becoming increasingly useful, or used to try to develop law enforcement capabilities around the 
world. But he added we need to think about it in terms of a regional context and make it more 
culturally or regionally specific. Second, Picarelli considered financial investigation units—or 
FIUs—which investigate money acquisition, movement and storage. He recommends that FIUs 
expand focus to criminal and non-traditional means of moving money and storing it, which are 
getting more creative, such as the use of auction houses, art, heirlooms which provide a 
mechanism for buying and selling by terrorists. Picarelli recommends a return to pre-9/11 
attempts to construct an interagency working group between the intelligence, Department of 
Homeland Security, and law enforcement communities, and to expand this to include academic 
experts and private sector firms, adding he believes the academic community has something to 
offer—particularly since ethnographic researchers have the opportunity to embed themselves in 
these areas where the nexus is forming, and can thus provide a wealth of information to share 
with intelligence, homeland security. Picarelli also recommended increasing the role of the 
international community, especially that of World Customs Organization (WCO) and the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) on Money Laundering, with its 40 recommendations enunciated in 
2003 as part of its global initiative to identify non-cooperative countries and territories (NCCTs) in 
the fight against money laundering. Picarelli added that corruption must be brought into the 
sphere of national security—not just as a cause for the nexus to form, but as a tactic and as such, 
anticorruption must be thought of more as a tool of homeland security. 
3. Discussion and Question Period 
Discussant Phil Williams, a professor at the University of Pittsburgh, presented his observations 
and comments on the presentations. After, there was a question period. One participant asked 
Picarelli to discuss the linkage between organized crime and terror and whether it was changing 
now? Picarelli replied, I think it's pretty tough to talk about change over time, as it's hard to get a 
good historical trace. But he speculated that there could be a radicalization of organized crime, 
and that within the organized crime side, there could be more radical ideologies adopted to be 
more sympathetic to terrorist groups. Another participant questioned Shapiro's recommendation 
that we shouldn't publicize freezing of funds, since one goal is deterring new entrants, and 
because of this, at one point there must be some thinking about when you publicize, and when 
you do not. Shapiro responded, Your first point is very well taken, adding I don't know how you 
would find out where to make that tradeoff, since the rate of seizures is not actually high 
enough—except immediately after 9/11 to deter entry. That participant also asked about 
communal punishment, noting I would want to know—given Israeli efforts to try to get 
communities to pay for allowing various terrorist groups to continue to operate, I think that's been 
a strategy that for years has not produced what we would ordinarily call successes—why do you 
see this as a good strategy rather than one that will create more problems and benefit? Shapiro 
clarified, I am not insisting we make communal punishment, just that we make it known that we 
know these ties are there, adding that the Israelis have really infiltrated communities where trust 
is problematic, and as a result the cohesion of those groups has broken apart. Shapiro concluded, 
my recommendation is not making punishment, but making it known people are being watched 
and surveilled and doing so publicly. A participant asked Picarelli about the relationship of 
security and civil liberties, and how do you balance security and civil liberties, to which Picarelli 
replied it was not quite the probable cause level, and added such a balance is rational and noted 
in the counterterrorism realm, the topic of civil liberties is a very heated discussion, but that 
doesn't besmirch some traditional prosecutorial techniques.  
 
Conference co-organizer Harold Trinkunas chats with panelists at conference dinner.  
Panel II. Terrorist Organizations & Financing  
Middle East and Islam expert Anne Marie Baylouney introduced the next panel, starting off with 
Victor Comras, an attorney and consultant on terror financing and sanctions who retired in 2001 
from the State Department with the rank of Minister Counselor; and, in absentia, Loretta 
Napoleoni—for whom conference co-organizer Jeannie Giraldo read her paper. The role of 
discussant was fulfilled by Dorothy Denning.  
1. Victor Comras—Al Qaeda Finances to Affiliated Groups 
Comras started out by explaining that considerable mystery and intrigue still surrounded al Qaeda 
funding—though it's estimated by the CIA that there is $30-40 million budget per year for al 
Qaeda, but we do not know what it needs or expends today, or from whom al Qaeda gets its 
money. We're not even sure the CIA budget estimate comes close to al Qaeda's true budget, 
since may be talking about operational funds. He added the picture we got from al Qaeda was 
that it drew on multiple sources, and its disparate cells drew on whatever it could—and it's now 
having a difficult time raising funds, and that the old al Qaeda, the base, may be facing a funding 
shortage. But while al Qaeda may be having hard times raising money these days, Comras 
explained, I don't think there is any shortage of funds available to radical Islam, jihad itself as its 
pace of funding is accelerating and considerable sums of money are passing to guys like al 
Zawqari in Iraq, and for new training camps in the former Soviet Union, and Africa. Added 
Comras, the pace of funds to radical Islamic teaching centers has either stayed constant or 
increased and added there are many grounds where we are seeing more recruitment and new 
solicitation of funds.  
Comras observed al Qaeda's reliance on charities has been put under close scrutiny, and many 
have been identified—and action has been taken against some of them. In many cases, a lot of 
what happened is the same individuals have opened new charities under new names, and 
remained under same umbrella like the World Muslim League and the International Islamic Relief 
Organization (IIRO) which is present in about 60 countries. Comras added that al Qaeda has 
taken full advantage of the lack of oversight of these charities, that donations remain anonymous, 
and some cases there are key operatives in key positions, and the result is a co-mingling of 
legitimate funds whose ultimate use to support al Qaeda activities can only be identified when 
those funds are transformed.  
Comras believes there is good reason to also look at the international drug trade operating in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, though how much of drug money reaches al Qaeda is uncertain—but 
some experts think al Qaeda s reliance on drug money has increased. He referred to Mirwais 
Yasini, who heads Afghanistan 's Counter Narcotics Directorate, who believes the Taliban and its 
allies generated over $150 million from drugs in 2003 and who sees a central linkage between 
the drug traffickers, Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden. Since the 1998 Embassy bombings and 
again after 9/11, Comras observed that banks have increased their vigilance. But in Malaysia, 
Comras observed there is still a don't ask policy with which they hope to attract business from 
those areas more tightly regulated, and the government of the Philippines is still trying to unravel 
shell businesses used to fund JI by Sheikh Khalifah. He also noted two banking networks 
established by al Qaeda facilitators, including the Al Barakat and Al Talqwa. Comras observed 
that the fight against terrorism has benefited significantly from intelligence for sure and that based 
upon forensic banking investigations and suspicious transaction reports there have been steps 
taken in many countries to designate individuals—but in many cases little happens, such as 
assets being frozen, and only $59 million associated with al Qaeda today has been frozen—most 
associated with Taliban. But to date, most countries have failed to take any action against 
tangible assets and only assets in bank accounts have been frozen, and many of the core 
facilitators are still able to access their businesses for income production. Indeed, the lists that the 
UN has is a very small percentage of the known al Qaeda world, and the list of UN producers is 
critical to the international action to freeze their assets and halt their transactions. If the individual 
or entity is not on the UN designated list, Comras explained that there's no domestic authority or 
obligation to act. Comras concluded that we also need to deal with the whole question of 
financing by charities, and by individuals and by the centers of recruitment, where the 
indoctrination process, the radical jihad philosophy is being taught—until we do this, we'll have a 
terribly difficult time stopping the financing of terrorism.  
2. Loretta Napoleoni—Terrorist Financing in Europe (as read by Jeanne Giraldo) 
NPS Professor Jeanne Giraldo read selections from Loretta Napoleoni's paper. Napoleoni is an 
Italian economist and author of Terror Inc. and, according to Giraldo, one of few people to have 
interviewed the Red Brigades, from which she learned how expensive it is to be a terrorist 
organization, as opposed to the cost of a single attack. She wrote that it cost from $7-8 million per 
year for the Red Brigades to operate, and that would be equivalent to $100 million today. Her 
research in Europe led her to realize that European terror groups had ties to Middle Eastern 
armed organizations and this led her to a wider investigation of terror financing, and with her book 
Terror Inc. she became one of the few people working on this topic before 9/11. As in the past, 
terror financing in Iraq today suggests a strong connection remains between Europe and armed 
organizations in the Middle East, and today, the terror movement in Iraq activated a network of 
European cells and sleepers, which connected to new networks and leaders like al Zarqawi, the 
rising star of Islamist terror in Iraq. Napoleoni's paper argues the old continent is a new regional 
hotbed for Islamist terror in the West. And al Zarqawi is head of a network with its base in Europe.  
The expansion of EU, Napoleoni added, makes Europe an attractive place to invest and to easily 
travel across borders to shift their funds, since there's really no one enforcing a travel ban within 
EU, or enforcing the shipping of funds from one country to another. As for purchasing fraudulent 
identity papers, it's substantially cheaper in the East. Napoleoni argued in her paper, the 
importance of Europe for terror financing has increased dramatically since 9/11. Napoleoni 
observes a post 9/11 migration of terrorist assets across the Atlantic to Europe. As Giraldo 
explained, Basically, al Qaeda closed its bank accounts in the U.S.—mostly—and invested in 
diamonds and shipped them offshore for two reasons: to shield them from counterterrorism 
efforts post-9/11, and because they were able to predict the fall in the amount of the dollar and 
wanted their assets in Europe. And in anticipation of the U.S. reaction to the attacks, such as a 
crackdown on shipping activities and, with the Patriot Act, which has been largely effective, 
there's been a crackdown on offshore banking, and stricter rules on know-your-customer led both 
criminal and terrorist activities to shift from the U.S. to places with more lax requirements. Now, 
terrorists are relying more on shipment of bulk cash, a rising trend in Europe, as terrorists and 
others using shipping containers to ship cash from one part of Europe to another, and paying for 
properties with cash.  
In contrast to the U.S., which moved swiftly to close its security loopholes after 9/11, Napoleoni 
observed that European countries are much more reluctant to take on charities than the U.S. and 
see it as very legitimate activity, paying more attention to that than the potential involvement in 
terrorist diversion of funds from charities. This dichotomy suggests the potential for a coordination 
problem, since the U.S. can pass one law but the EU can only issue directives so it's easy for 
terrorists to take advantage of globalization, the lack of border restrictions in those parts of the EU 
with restrictions less tight, and the integration of the economies of East and West. However, since 
Madrid the EU has issued an action paper calling for better implementation of existing counter-
terrorism legislations, and soon thereafter appointed an antiterrorism czar and agreed to a 
comprehensive package of measures to increase data sharing and speedup the use of biometric 
identification, and to expand the Container Security Initiative with the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security.  
3. Discussion and Question Period  
Panel discussant Dorothy Denning, a professor in the Department of Defense Analysis and 
author of Information Warfare & Security, provided commentary on the two presentations, and 
found both papers were excellent, very informative. After Denning's discussion, a question and 
answer period followed. One participant asked Comras if there is centralized control over al 
Qaeda's budget? Comras replied, information suggests al Qaeda did originally have a financial 
committee high up in the base's structure but it was likely dismantled and now finances are now 
located more at local level. Another participant asked, How do we know what we know? Some 
sources say al Qaeda doesn't get much funding from drugs, other sources say they do. Comras 
replied, it all depends on the source's credibility, how it sits in our gut. But if we consider what we 
do know, he said significant amounts of drugs are produced in Afghanistan, in former Soviet 
Union areas like Chechnya, and other points east, and that al Qaeda is somewhere in this area 
and needs support, and that the Taliban needs this support—and maybe drawing upon these 
funds a very credible idea one has to take at face value. Can we prove that in a court of law? No, 
but because it is plausible, we have to assume that it's a possibility. 
Phil Williams observed very conventional traditional diplomatic things are not working, are not 
stringent enough, as there are not enough states cooperating. Comras replied, I start off with the 
notion that we are doing certain things, and need to start worrying about doing better first. For 
instance, if you're not on the UN's designation list, there's no international cooperation so we 
need to focus on building that list. Right now, Comras noted, the level of international cooperation 
for dealing with terrorism is atrocious—and while the U.S. has done well bilaterally, there's been 
so little international cooperation at international community level. Shapiro noted Comras had 
started off his talk by noting one of reasons for the growth in activity has been increased funding 
to fundamentalist groups—yet not all such groups engage in jihadi behavior, and observed that 
even Hezbollah has modulated its level of violence over the years, and is more like a political 
party now. Shapiro wondered why do some groups engage in violence, since it's not inherent in 
Islamist philosophy? Comras replied that some percentage of donations got funneled into 
jihadism, so with regard to donors, it's not necessarily an intent, but when it became clear to 
donors this was occurring Comras said they did not change their patterns of giving—so while they 
did not intend to fund terror activities, but they nevertheless continued to provide funding knowing 
some of it would go to these purposes.  
With regard to Napoleoni's contention of an al Qaeda capital outflow from the U.S. prior to 9/11, 
Giraldo noted she's not convinced we are seeing this shift from U.S. to Europe, as Europe has 
always been a hub, and you want to have your finances where you have your supercells. While a 
capital flow from the U.S. to Europe is plausible, she noted she has not seen evidence, and that 
this argument put forth by Napoleoni still needs more substantiation. Another participant asked 
about the risks of putting innocents on the cooperation list and noted this can be economically 
devastating, and Comras clarified that we only should designate those whom we suspect of being 
involved, adding that based on intelligence information—while this can be challenged in a court of 
law and won't stand evidentiary tests, that we still need to take this balance and we need to have 
a good, plausible, credible review of intelligence information in making a determination to freeze 
civil assets, as this is different from criminal proceedings. But even in the realm of terror, we still 
need to find the right balance.  
 
Conference co-organizer Jeanne Giraldo chats with panelists Jessica Piombo and 
John Picarelli. 
III. Terrorism Financing in Comparative Perspective  
The chair of the afternoon panel, conference co-organizer and NPS lecturer Jeanne Giraldo, 
introduced the afternoon panel after lunch.  
1A. John Lombardi, Department of Defense  
First up was John Lombardi, who works in the Pentagon combating terrorism and who noted 
because of the sensitive nature of his work, he would be functioning under certain constraints, to 
ensure his paper's being properly vetted. The focus of his work is on the Tri-Border Area (TBA) in 
Latin America where the frontiers of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay all meet, and which has 
figured heavily for last two decades as a nexus for drug traffickers and spies and even—in last 
decade—for terrorists. Lombardi explained our info comes down to a couple of cases, including 
the fact that the government of Paraguay is moving against a number of individuals affiliated with 
a number of Middle Eastern groups, and on top of this, he noted there is a lot of anecdotal 
information, but there remains a large gap when it comes to verifiable information.  
The TBA is a nexus between two major points, and a drop off for air travel between those two 
points, and the region is economically important for legitimate business and illegitimate as well. 
According to the Brazilian government, $12 billion is laundered through the TBA each year, and 
that's just on their side. According to estimates by the Commander of the U.S. Southern 
Command, James T. Hill, some $50 to $500 billion is laundered in the TBA, as the area is vibrant 
and alive with legitimate and specifically illegitimate businesses. Out of this has emerged a 
terrorism financing network, with several figures involved including merchant Assad Ahmad 
Barakat, who has been designated a key Hezbollah financier responsible for sending at least $50 
million to Hezbollah since 1995. Lombardi believes terrorism financing does happen there, and 
notes it's a permissive environment, with weak legislation on all sides of the border, poor law 
enforcement, non transparent financial institutions, poorly monitored borders beyond the 
checkpoints we had there, and easy access to illicit activities conducted by organized crime. 
Lombardi explained that the TBA provides us with indicators that we hope are able to be applied 
to other areas in Latin America and the Caribbean to identify that kind of activity, and as such is a 
good case for us despite the lack of really good verifiable information.  
1B. Lieutenant David Sanchez, Analyst, U.S. Southern Command 
After Lombardi spoke, his colleague and research partner Lieutenant David Sanchez, assigned to 
the U.S. Southern Command as an analyst and a 2003 graduate of NPS, presented. Sanchez 
has found that there's enough evidence to suggest the TBA is a strategic area in the global war 
on terrorism and that the TBA is a strategically important environment. Sanchez noted there are 
multilateral efforts to combat terrorism in the TBA, with the Organization of American States (OAS) 
and the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism leading the charge to combat terrorism 
financing. But there are also challenges in multilateral organizations, as there is no way to compel 
states to act on their recommendations—so while we can talk about these things there is still no 
way to enforce their recommendations. Sanchez noted there's another sub-regional forum, the 
3+1 made up of Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil and the U.S., which he described as an effective 
forum that concentrates governmental efforts on combating terrorism and terrorist financing in the 
TBA, but its most recent meeting was as far back as December 2003 when it concluded there 
isn't enough information to confirm operational activities are taking place in the TBA, though it is 
concerned with money laundering. Sanchez noted within the region, there are some national and 
bilateral efforts—but these vary considerably. Sanchez believes that we do have enough proof to 
conclude the TBA is a permissive environment but has found its countries are working to 
strengthen their regimes, but work needs to be done in a lot of areas. Sanchez added there is a 
lot more that we don't know than we know. For instance, we don't even know Hezbollah's annual 
budget—and as for its fundraising in the TBA, we know it's going on but, it's really impossible to 
pinpoint how much money has been raised in the TBA. As well, we don't know the connection of 
people in the TBA to their parent organizations.  
2. Jessica Piombo—Terrorist Financing and Government Response in East Africa 
After Lombardi's and Sanchez's presentation on the TBA, Assistant Professor at NPS specializing 
in comparative and African politics, Jessica Piombo, spoke about terrorism financing in East 
Africa, a region that is home to some huge masses of land that starts in Sudan, and includes 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar, and Tanzania. Piombo noted that most of our 
counterterrorism thoughts are on Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan in the Horn region. Piombo notes a lot 
of changes we've seen in terrorism financing doesn't date from 9/11, since most East African 
changes happened after 1998—after the Embassy bombings forced a little more attention to the 
region than there had been. So a lot of what we see in terms of anti-money laundering legislation 
and renewed focus on borders happened after '98, and got boosted after 9/11 with the arrival of 
more aid. Piombo next discussed indigenous vs. transnational organizations, noting that 
transnational groups primarily involve al Qaeda in East Africa and in the West Africa region—
which she will not be addressing in today's presentation—both Hezbollah and al Qaeda. Among 
the indigenous groups, Piombo noted there are very few designated foreign terrorist 
organizations (FTOs) in East Africa, with the only ones in northern Africa —the Armed Islamic 
Group (GIA) and the Salafist Group for Call and Conflict (GSPC), from Algeria. There are a 
couple of 'other terrorist group' designated organizations in Somalia, Uganda and Rwanda, like 
the Lords Resistance Army of Uganda, where there are a lot of ethnic, Islamic, and Christian 
terror organizations. But she added most indigenous organization don't make it on our watch list, 
as they haven't staged events of the scale that really grabbed our attention in the west.  
As for their financing, Piombo noted most of these groups sort of engage in unsophisticated 
terrorism financing, since there are few banks, some small banks, and in Eritrea the banks don't 
even use computers. With cash economies, they rely a lot on Hawala-dar, the informal system 
with human couriers carrying cash, gold other goods across borders in these areas that are very 
porous. There is so much human traffic and transporting operatives up and down the coast, 
Piombo commented, we're talking—I don't want to use the word primitive when talking about 
Africa—but they are basic. She next discussed the role of charities, which serve largely Muslim 
populations, and when we're talking about the Islamic connection, it is very strong—and a lot of 
people are contributing to the charities, though whether they mean to be supporting terrorism, 
we're not sure of but regardless of their intent, once contributing to the charities, it is in the 
system. Adding to the mix, Piombo noted there are large Diaspora communities all over the 
world—largely because these have been unstable areas for decades. As for money laundering, 
Piombo noted that in terms of the traditional way we think of it, it is not a major factor as there is a 
low incidence of extensive formal banking systems.  
As for transnational groups, Piombo noted that al Qaeda is the largest one -but despite its size, it 
is financed in the same way pretty much as the indigenous groups. She observed Osama bin 
Laden was active in setting up business contacts there and owns much of the cement industry 
there—and with these business ties bringing money back into the organization. She noted that no 
matter how much we try, there's no solid evidence of organized al Qaeda cells in any country 
other than Kenya in the region. Piombo noted this irony—that al Qaeda has operatives in one of 
the most stable states in the region—Kenya, and not Somalia—they're in Kenya! Piombo asked, 
Why does al Qaeda like East Africa? She observed that like the TBA, East Africa has porous 
borders, with overland trade from Sudan and large migratory populations, and also like the TBA, 
there's corruption, and it's very easy to operate there as a lot of regimes are founded on 
corruption. Plus there's easy access to the Middle East. Piombo considered, in closing, Why we 
don't see a better effort to enforce terrorism financing measures, and answered that within the 
region there is no law enforcement capacity, with Sudan in state of war, with nebulous control 
over its country. As well, she added it's not in leaders' interests to implement anti-money 
laundering regimes since this would hurt their own sources of income, and since most people use 
informal banking systems, she believes that efforts to cut down on their ability to use the systems 
would cause mass riots, so they can not crack down on it.  
3. Discussion and Question Period 
The panel's discussant was Maria Jose Rasmussen, Associate Professor in the Department of 
National Security Affairs at NPS, who commented, I like that both papers challenge the 
conventional wisdom and their suggestion is in Africa, and maybe the TBA, or both, the existence 
of a haven is much more important than the amount of money they are making in the area. She 
provided three categories of comments: on form, substance and ancillary issues, and added that 
these authors need to be commended on their efforts to stick with the framework provided by the 
conference organizers.  
A question period followed the presentations. Rafael Perl asked: From a policy perspective, how 
important are these areas in terms of raising money for terrorist groups, and do you see a trend, 
escalating or de-escalation? Sanchez responded to this question, replying that there is no 
indication the TBA is equivalent to other areas, or if al Qaeda is operational there—but rather the 
importance of the area is it's a permissive environment, and has the potential to become so much 
more, and as such, he said our policy recommendation is to increase bilateral assistance to help 
those nations help themselves. One participant asked about the spread of radical Islam in East 
Africa, and Piombo noted there are several variants on Islam in the region, and while the Saudis 
have gone down and tried to radicalize them, that these efforts are not working—as the Islamic 
communities are localized, insular and don't like people telling them what to do, and are thus not 
accepting the Saudi variant of Islam. Piombo noted that the war on terror is perceived to be 
America 's problem, but not their problem in East Africa—since states in East Africa don't have 
the force protection, and don't even try to protect their borders from terrorist infiltration since their 
borders are porous. She noted how we got our first base in Africa, in 2002—putting boots on the 
ground again, which took us ten years after Somalia during which there were no boots on the 
ground, and that as a percentage of resources, our resource commitment to the region appears 
small—and because regions are so huge, we have to put significant resources in to have any 
impact in such vast geographies. When asked if she could make policy recommendations, what 
would they be, Piombo reflected that if she were advising the NSC for Africa terrorism financing, 
she said she would recommend pretty much more of the same, using U.S. aid to boost capacity 
in the region, and that she would emphasize more capacity building than anything else since you 
can't counter money laundering without police.  
 
Panelists enjoy some fresh air and sunshine during a coffee break.  
Day Two—Friday, November 5, 2004 
Panel IV: Terrorism Financing—Sources and Transfers of Funding  
The second day of the conference began with introductory remarks by panel chair, Surinder Rana, 
a Research Fellow at NPS who teaches courses on South Asia Security and is a former colonel 
in the Indian Army. He introduced two distinguished panel presenters, starting with Professor Phil 
Williams of the University of Pittsburgh.  
1. Phil Williams—Follow Not Freeze: Terrorist Finances and Attack Warning Indicators 
Williams explained by way of his background that I come to the terrorist issue by way of 
organized crime, and noted in his research at the Swedish Ministry of Defense, he couldn't find a 
nexus between terror and organized crime, and believes that most comments on this nexus have 
been really premature. He observed there's been a two-pronged strategy since 9/11, to identify, 
freeze and seize and following the money. Williams noted there are tradeoffs to consider, and 
that it's very clear that freezing stops funding, makes it difficult to recruit, train and get weapons—
but it doesn't stop operations which are relatively cheap. But Williams explained there are 
problems with the freeze strategy, and that is freezing is not successful, since it prevents 
identifying the way transactions could provide indicators, and Williams thinks we should accept 
that attempts to freeze have failed and instead, encourage terrorists to be more reckless with the 
money. Another problem with the freeze strategy is that it has extended a flawed and incomplete 
regime, the Financial Action Task Force ( FATF) regime—where success had been limited, as the 
FATF has not really done a good job since it was created by the G7 in 1989, though he 
acknowledged FATF has placed money laundering on the international agenda to a degree 
unimagined at the time of its creation.  
Drawing upon complexity theory, Williams noted there is co-evolution, as we and the terrorists co-
evolve together—and as a result they are very good at circumventing what we do, and if you take 
it as a kind of competition, one thing we do very often is push them onto a higher fitness peak and 
make them more sophisticated, all in response to our measures. Williams believes we should 
consider covert methods against the financiers, and that there should be some cases of 
disappearing financing. Williams closed his presentation with some recommendations, saying, 
Forget freeze—just follow the money! In terms of analytical tools, he noted we do need baseline 
patterns, and need to go from strategic warning to tactical warning and thus we've got to get 
down to another level of detail, and this means we need new combinations of expertise. And in 
the long term. Williams believes we need to think about transnational threats, and must retool the 
way we organize our intelligence and analysis, from the bottom on up, since we are still geared 
up for dealing with the U.S.SR, looking for large, hierarchical bureaucratic threats. We therefore 
need to recognize networks, and the way the new threat is organized. Williams closed by again 
urging that we drop freeze, and emphasize the difficulty of tracking terrorist transactions and thus 
lull terrorists into a false sense of security.  
2. Nikos Passas, Professor of Criminal Justice, Northeastern University—Sources of 
Terrorist Funds and Methods of Transfer: Key Debates 
Next, Professor Nikos Passas—professor of criminal justice at Northeastern University with 
expertise in terrorist financing; white collar, organized, and transnational crime; and informal 
transfer of money—presented his paper. Passas explained this journey we are on together, 
exploring terror financing, is like the adventure of Christopher Columbus, who, as history records, 
didn't know where he was going, where he landed—and did it public funds. Passas noted his 
agreement with Williams' argument against freezing terror assets, saying, I agree with Phil, as the 
most important one is following the money and creating intelligence and not just seizing a few 
million, especially without knowing what the effects of those seizures are.  
Further hampering things has been imprecise knowledge, cultural misunderstandings, and 
inadequate evidence. Passas noted terrorism is a law enforcement, military, socio-economic and 
political problem and as such we need to concentrate on not only short-term approaches but long 
term ones, and not only the supply side—such as who is helping terrorists, but also the demand 
side—such as those who are turning a blind eye. He added, if we are to get this right, Passas 
believes what is important is that we sort out precisely who are the enemies, and how they are 
organized.  
Next, Passas considered how do they raise money and how do they move it? He added there is a 
huge disconnect between the multi-billion or -trillion dollar terrorism economy, and the few 
hundred thousands it takes to blow up a train. Or how it could be these guys awash in gold could 
not afford the $500 it takes to help one of its operatives there get his wife a Caesarian-section in 
a proper hospital. This huge disconnect is worthy of consideration. As for the diamond theory, 
that al Qaeda is involved in rough conflict diamonds derived from the conflict in Western Africa, 
and in particular Sierra Leone, and then use these diamonds to store their value after 9/11; and 
that the Taliban used a 30-day period to move their assets out of the West, Passas said he 
looked at the evidence provided by intelligence people, the military and law enforcement, adding I 
wasted four months of my research life, and that there was nothing to the theory, and widespread 
belief otherwise has resulted in policies built on thin-air facts. In addition to his research on 
diamonds, Passas noted that Hawala was the other area we looked at—finding that yes, there 
was Hawala in Afghanistan, everyone used it there as it was the only institution that works there. 
But when you look at the way 9/11 was conducted, there was not Hawala in the 9/11 operations, 
but instead banks and ATMs were used. Passas also noted, there is the question of whether we 
can fight terrorists with money laundering techniques, and asked, would one of them have red-
flagged the 9/11 operation? Zero. So, Passas wondered, what are these recommendations 
coming from, how could they be helpful?  
Passas considered the way we approach charities, and when authorities took assets away the 
result was devastating good work, with much collateral damage, yet in the end leading to no 
criminal actions against these organizations. Passas believes this does not look good. Instead of 
focusing on infiltrating, devastating, decapitating, he believes we have to take a look to outreach, 
which can also be helpful without producing counterproductive effects for us. Passas also asked, 
What do you do when you have intelligence information about something, but nothing useful for a 
criminal charge? I think monitoring is the way to go, rather than grabbing the assets. In the end, 
Passas said it's all about winning the war on terror with legitimacy, since we can not win the war 
on terror without legitimate means used in this process—and that brings me to collaboration, 
adding that the sharing of information needs to be done on a real-time, need-to-know basis, 
domestically, nationally and internationally—or we're not going to go anywhere.  
3. Discussion and Question Period 
After Passas' presentation, Moyara Ruehsen, professor of economics and illicit markets at the 
Monterey Institute of International Studies, presented her comments as discussant, starting with 
Williams' papers, saying she liked it—and added, I love counter-intuitive conclusions, and I think 
your supporting evidence, not freezing those assets but following them to map out networks, is 
very compelling evidence, and you make the argument strongly. She also liked Passas' paper, 
noting you make the same message that Phil does: that what we're doing now is counter-
productive, and if we take anything away from this conference, that's a useful lesson to be 
learned. In conclusion, she reiterated that on the whole, these were two very interesting papers. A 
question period followed during which there was feisty debate on the ethics, and practicalities of 
the freezing-assets vs. follow-the-money schools of thought in terms of counterterrorism.  
Victor Comras referred to the debate over freezing or follow-up, noting freezing includes various 
things: there is freezing of assets, and freezing of transactions, stopping a transaction. He added, 
What you are suggesting is don't stop that transaction—but let it happen. But freezing of assets is 
more akin to punishment, taking asserts of supporters, and as such is a punitive action, and 
maybe only one available on the international scene. Comras wonders, maybe we need to do 
both? A participant (female) observed that prior to 1998, we were doing that with Osama bin 
Laden's assets, watching them, learning from them. Williams noted, one FBI guy explained it 
wasn't that we were asleep on the job; we couldn't get any sleep on the job and as such were so 
overstretched. As for freezing assets, Williams reiterated his argument that freezing certainly 
hasn't worked, noting only $37 million in assets have been frozen since the first $100 million was 
frozen in the first two months after 9/11—and that this is a pretty poor record. Passas next spoke, 
explaining I know there is a punitive process involved in the designation process, and that it is an 
executive decision made, but there's no transparency or due process on how we designate 
someone. He added, what happens when we realized we got nothing on them; how do we take 
them off the list? He said this illustrates the problems with counter productive policies. Comras 
responded, noting the Barakat case and its controversy, as the designation still stands at 
Treasury because they believe they have sufficient intelligence evidence to pack it up, even if 
there's not enough evidentiary evidence.  
 
Conference organizers enjoy a relaxing evening with the panelists. 
Panel V: Terrorism Financing in Asia 
The chair of the fifth panel, Brigadier General (retired) Feroz Khan, a South Asian security expert 
on the NPS faculty and thirty year veteran of the Pakistan military with an expertise in nuclear 
weapons strategy, who introduced panelists Surinder Rana and John Broome.  
1. Surinder Rana, Naval Postgraduate School—Terrorism Financing and Government 
Responses in South Asia—The Kashmir Region 
Rana noted how Kashmir is one of most populated regions in the world, where terrorism, crime 
and political exploitation, everything kind of goes side by side. The Kashmir region is very 
significant, as it is in dispute between India and Pakistan, and as such it is very important to know 
the perceptions of both sides. However, Rana explained, I will not get into the politics of each side, 
but added that when you say terrorism financing in Kashmir, it is challenging to resolve: is it 
terrorism or some kind of freedom fight going on? What is this, terrorism or a freedom fight? Rana 
lived in that area for seven years and is very convinced it is terrorism and it's not a freedom fight. 
He added that terror is used as a tool of political violence, and since the British quit India, the 
Kashmir dispute has remained unsolved—and violence is prevailing. Rana explained that some 
of this violence is maintained by the political dynamics of this region.  
Rana discussed the pattern of violence, methods of violence, and casualties that resulted, noting 
that from 1988-2004, the total killed—including terrorists, civilians and security forces—was 
37,847, with 17,160 of those terrorists; 12,462 of those civilians; and 8,175 of those security 
personnel. And, he noted, 20% of terrorists are Kashmiris, while 80% are outsiders. Rana 
presented an ethnic breakdown of the data on casualties, noting that most of the casualties are 
Muslims, and from this he concluded that the freedom fighters are killing their own community. 
While state involvement has fluctuated over the years, Rana observed that now a peace process 
is going on, and while it's not possible for the Pakistan government to take their hand out of this 
issue, currently their involvement is very low, and their sincerity toward the peace process going 
on is very high.  
As for the methods of terror, these include bombings, extortion, heavy machine guns. And, added 
Rana, all this stuff is not produced in Kashmir, and to date, the India military has captured around 
40,000 Kalashnikovs —yet Rana noted India does not produce Kalashnikovs, so they must be 
coming from outside Kashmir. Rana also considered the sources of terror financing, noting funds 
comes from charities, donations, foreign sympathizers, extortion, business and trade, drugs and 
bank robberies. Rana observes that just 10% of finances are raised inside Kashmir, while 90% 
comes from the outside. He added that within Kashmir, there are domestic sources: charities, 
relations (in the mosques), jihad and the Kashmir freedom movement, which collects money 
through donation boxes. Rana noted some terror organizations have established front businesses 
in the region, and more recently, terrorists have turned to the drug trade, which Rana described 
as a recent phenomenon, noting since 2003, large tracts in the valley have been used by 
terrorists and sympathizers to grow drugs and that is becoming one of the big sources of terrorist 
money in Kashmir.  
Rana considered the sources of external support of terrorism in Kashmir, noting its main base is 
in Pakistan, but asking, who in Pakistan does this? He replied that over the years, support has 
come from the state apparatus, charities, foreign donors, coercion in name of jihad, 
business/trade, a criminal/terrorist nexus, drugs/weapons smuggling, counterfeit currency, and 
money laundering. However, Rana noted that since 9/11, Pakistan has been taking measures to 
reduce its role as a terror sponsor in Kashmir. Additionally, Rana noted that Saudi charities also 
give their money—as do Pakistani charities—as part of their religious obligation, and then how 
they use it is beyond their control, though upon donation most donors know it's very much for a 
larger kind of Islamic caliphate or wahadism. But not all money is freely donated, Rana observed, 
as coercion in name of jihad is common practice in the Kashmir Valley as well as in Pakistan, too, 
as religious fronts and political front organizations coerce people to support jihad.  
Rana discussed methods of transferring money into Kashmir to fund terror operations, noting 
couriers physically carry most money used by Kashmiri terrorists across the Line of Control (LOC), 
but that banking instruments have also been used, as well as drug money. Plus, there has been 
known to be some misuse of official channels, such as the case of a Pakistan diplomat caught 
handing cash to some of these groups in Delhi in 1993, resulting in a series of diplomatic 
expulsions and causing a diplomatic row. Rana also observed the role of Hawala, or Hundi. Rana 
noted it's part of the culture. But because it is so ubiquitous, it can be used for legitimate and illicit 
purposes. But on the whole, Rana believes that 95% goes to legit purposes. Rana presented a 
slide depicting the government responses—by both India and Pakistan—who have both taken 
responses, which vary considerably, and include political, legislative, economic and military 
means. For evaluating responses, Rana pointed out, the basic thing is, all this terrorism financing 
is going on, and because Hawala is so central to the region's economy, most measures to curb 
terror financing are largely cosmetic, and aimed at a foreign audience. Rana noted there's a very 
thin line between politics, law enforcement, keeping efforts to a minimum, as so many politicians 
benefit from untraceable slush money generated through such informal systems of money 
transfer. And, because criminals and terrorists rely on this kind of money, Rana added that it's 
very, very difficult to counter some of these influences.  
2. John Broome, Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention, University of Wollongong, 
Australia—Terrorism Financing and State Response in South East Asia 
Next, John Broome, from the Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention in Wollongong, Australia, 
presented. Broome recalled that during the last four to five years, he's been working in Southeast 
Asia —working mainly on aid-funded projects to implement counterterrorism financing regimes in 
that part of the world. He's thus had a front row seat to money-laundering and terrorism related 
issues, and based on his field experience, a major focus of my paper is where I see the need to 
look at new strategies and approaches.  
Broome ran through some of the terror groups in the region, including Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), New People's Army (NPA), and Abu Sayeff Group (ASG). 
He noted that in the Philippines, the national pastime is kidnapping for ransom, adding that 
people fund campaigns by kidnapping their opponents, making it a serious issue. He recalled that 
Abu Sayeff had kidnapped a number of people from southern Malaysia, and the Libyans paid the 
$25 million ransom. With payouts like that, you don't need to do it very often to sustain yourself 
for the long-term. Broome next discussed the government response to terrorism across the region, 
noting it has been very 'catchy' and while there's almost universal adherence to the international 
refrain of we must attack terrorism, and do it by focusing on its financing and move forward 
together, which they said for the last three years, but what governments have done has been 
actually quite different.  
The Philippines, he observed, has several of the right themes and while there's been a bit 
concerted effort by a few to make the system work, there remain systemic barriers like 
government inertia, financial system disinterest, etc. As for Indonesia, whose politicians are rarely 
criticized by the U.S., and in reality—it is one of the few places to have prosecuted terrorists as it 
did after the bombings in Bali. Noting they were put under enormous international pressure, 
Indonesia used those special rules and they were encouraged to do so by the international 
community—but the trouble with these laws they used is that they made to cover the Bali 
circumstance after the fact, and even Indonesia 's constitutional court said these were invalid. 
Broome noted the irony, that we encouraged Indonesia to adopt the rule of law, and when they 
did it, after the results from their constitutional court, they got criticized by Australia—which 
wanted justice. With Malaysia, Broome said, one of the worst things is to be told by others what to 
do, as Malaysia simply will not jump to someone else's tune, whereas other countries are more 
prepared to go along with the international consensus, though more often than not this is just 
language, while under the covers it keeps going on. Malaysia blends its strict detention laws, 
unwavering condemnation of terrorism, and punitive measures such as de-funding 500 Islamic 
schools found to be preaching anti-government sentiment and fostering militancy. Overall, 
Broome noted there have been mixed results in region. But that's partly because the biggest 
issue is not terrorism in Southeast Asia—as they've lived with these issues for years, so there's 
not the same type of national impact as in U.S. since 9/11. It's essentially a different part of the 
world, a different perspective. So people in the region don't necessarily see things from the same 
perspective when there is pressure to respond in the same way, and the issue is how well you 
can transfer this message.  
Across region, Broome noted the 40 FATF recommendations are less a blueprint for success and 
instead have become an end to themselves, as you can follow all 40 and still not solve the 
problem. I do have a problem when FATF says terrorist financing is akin to money laundering, as 
they are getting it back to front, as money laundering is taking funds earned from criminal activity 
and trying to hide its origins, and thus legitimate it, whereas terror financing, by definition is the 
moving of legitimate funds to illegitimate purposes. So equating terror financing with money 
laundering is a bit like what Humpty Dumpty said to Alice in Through the Looking Glass, when he 
told her, a words means just what I choose it to mean. FATF tried to pick up the international 
mechanics in a shorthand fashion as an easy way of solving the problem, but the way things have 
turned out, what I think they have done is undermined their efforts—as governments are not 
paying attention to money laundering but instead doing what they were told to do—executing on 
FATF—and doing it very badly. And after 9/11, FATF issued 8 special recommendations, adding 
a ninth on October 22 of this year, which Broome believes reflects a failure of analysis which was 
the direct result of a desire to act immediately.' For instance, FATF special recommendation 
number 6 recommends that countries should take measure to ensure informal money 
transactions are licensed and registered, and subscribe to all FATF rules, and Broome points out 
that the result would be that Hawala networks would lose their efficiency and cost advantage, so 
as a result, not a single one in the region has been licensed, and not a single will. Broome notes 
that most funds transferred through Hawala are legitimate, and since there's no banking system 
to sustain and as such Hawala is not even an underground, and not an alternative, but instead, it 
is the only system.  
Another FATF special recommendation, number 9, recommends that countries should now have 
measures in place to detect physical cross border transportation of currency—and Broome said, 
again I ask, 'really?' as most people passing through international airports have some reporting 
system or other, and yet there limits are almost always $10,000 U.S. or more, and in Europe are 
15,000 euros, so you can travel back and forth with $9,000 in your pack until the cows come 
home. and thus be able to fund a nice terrorist operation. And, added Broome, haven't they heard 
of the EU? There are no borders, so how will you declare money going from France to Germany ? 
Yet this is the kind of system that countries are getting pressure to join.  
Regarding issues and problems to be dealt with more substantially, Broome said he doesn't think 
we will do much that is successful in tracing funding for terrorism, as there are fields and fields of 
haystacks, and in Southeast Asia financial institutions have no idea what they're supposed to be 
looking for, such as training staff who are supposed to be on front line and are supposed to find 
suspicious transactions. Banking officials are thus scared stiff that when money transfers through 
their institutions, governments will blame them. It's Broome's belief that Citibank is more likely to 
be used for terror financing, so we must get the banks involved as part of the solution, bring them 
into the tent, tell them what we know, encourage them to be part of the solution. Right now, if 
someone files a STR—or suspicious transaction reports—in Southeast Asia, there's a real 
possibility it will result in a vacancy in the bank manager's position, because that bank manager 
filed a STR! Indeed, since money is currency, Broome is confident that police would leak it, 
dooming any bank manager that cooperates with FATF rules. Broome also argues in his paper 
that legislation doesn't solve the problem, since no terrorist will stop—and say this is unlawful. As 
Broome reiterated, we must get the banks involved, as terrorists are evolving and changing, and 
we must evolve and change as well.  
3. Discussion and Question Period 
Panel discussant Brigadier General (ret.) Feroz Khan noted both papers presented represent a 
span across two distinct regions—South Asia and Southeast Asia—and while each of these 
contiguous regions is beset with tremendous problems and each has a long post colonial history 
of grievances and regional rivalries, they are also in so many ways so different: one is more 
islands, archipelagos and you can see this difference in modes of transfer. Yet both regions have 
porous borders making it easy to transfer funds across them.  
In the case of South Asia, Kahn noted there is a danger here, in that it can sometimes be hard to 
differentiate between terrorism and regional disputes. He cited the words of former National 
Security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who expressed concern that the U.S. global war on terror 
would be hijacked by others for their own agenda in a New York Times op/ed from September 1, 
2002 (Confronting Anti-America Grievances.) As Brzezinski wrote, The rather narrow, almost one 
dimensional definition of the terrorist threat favored by the Bush Administration, poses the special 
risk that foreign powers will also seize upon the word 'terrorism' to promote their own agendas, as 
President Vladimir Putin of Russia, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel, Prime Minister Atal 
Bihari Vajpaee of India and President Jiang Zemin of China are doing… Hindu fanatics in India 
are also quite eager to conflate Islam in general with terrorism in Kashmir in particular.”  
Khan is concerned that the subject becomes very difficult when there is a blurring of the 
distinction between the global war on terror and intractable regional disputes, and leads nowhere 
other than to simply understanding the complexity of South Asia. Khan believes that the non-
resolution of festering local disputes in itself is a huge cause of instability and global concern, and 
added some of his own insights on the complex roots of the Kashmir conflict—noting that while 
India and Pakistan are both partners in the global war on terror, their roles differ vastly, with very 
distinct historical experiences. For instance, Khan noted the rise of Hindu fundamentalism in India 
is largely an indigenous phenomenon, and it was not exported from outside, while the case of 
Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan is a result of both internal changes and external 
circumstances: internally, the military coup led by Gen Zia-ul Haq in 1977 after an Islamist backed 
movement against the secular government of Z. A. Bhutto in the mid-seventies laid the foundation. 
But the rise of extremism and militancy in the region was externally driven, and the revolution in 
Iran and war against the Soviets in Afghanistan had a profound impact on Pakistani Society, and 
the Kashmir uprising in 1989, at this juncture, was just ripe for the demobilized Mujahideen, and 
changing internal dynamics in the region to be sucked in.  
After Khan's presentation, a question period followed—during which Rana noted his paper did 
consider cultural and social issues, adding, I have given emphasis on that, and noting there are 
certain divisions, as people have their own belief systems which in turn pushes them to rely on 
certain procedures such as Hawala, which is a necessity in South Asia. As for the external 
influences on Kashmir, Rana articulated his belief that both sides have been involved—there are 
no clean hands, and that both sides have been involved in these kinds of activities—both India 
and Pakistan. He added that it goes both ways. Rana noted his appreciation of the comments, 
noting, some of these comments will defi nitely be incorporated into my paper and improved from 
that.  
Broome spoke next, noting that in the Philippines, there are some 40,000 islands and anything 
moves across those islands, across to Borneo, Brunei, to Malaysia, and as a consequence, the 
systems we're used to thinking about controlling movements of people and money just don't work 
in Southeast Asia. As for cultural norms, Broome mentioned the fact that 7-8 million people work 
offshore, and send $7-10 billion back to the Philippines, without which the country would sink 
back into the sea, and it keeps food in peoples' mouths—with around $3 billion coming into the 
Philippines through unofficial channels. With Western Union charging $14 for a $100 wire transfer, 
and Hawala charging only a few percent, incredibly small amounts of money can be moved 
around the region with absolutely no financial institutions involved, so there's simply no 
discernible characteristic to identify when tracking terror funds, as they will look just like the other 
$6 or 7 billion worth of transfers coming in. That's why Broome recommends, Let's stop thinking 
this is even a realistic strategy. He believes we can use intelligence much better than in the 
past—such as understanding each other's legal norms, something he believes is more important. 
He recalled when Australia police went to Bali to investigate the Bali bombing as criminal event, 
they were seeking evidentiary material suitable for Australian courts but not necessarily local 
ones. Broome believes we should be developing arrangements in the region, where people have 
those skills appear—for instance, to assemble evidence that meets jurisdictional evidentiary 
requirements. This is something more practical than finding patterns of financial transactions. 
Sorry, that's not going to happen.  
Jake Shapiro asked about the casualty statistics presented by Rana, and observing that if 17,000 
terrorists were killed and 12,000 civilians were killed, then if they were truly targeting civilians, 
they appear to be bad at it. Shapiro wanted to know if these 12,000 were mostly civilians killed in 
crossfire of intentional attacks on civilians. Rana explained to Shapiro that the 12,000 civilians 
were killed over 40 years, some from explosions in buses, ransom kidnappings, attacks against 
village defense committees, grenades thrown on security force's vehicles that missed and land in 
civilian markets. He added that only a small percentage got killed in crossfire, and that crossfire 
gets around 10% of the civilian casualties. Victor Comras asked Broome the place Southeast 
Asia sits in international terrorism, as the recipient of funds internationally, or a supplier of funds 
internationally or only as a regional financial issue. Broome replied there are a lot of groups like 
Abu Sayeff, typically self-funded, and there has also always been a crime/terrorism nexus, that's 
why JI, why al Qaeda are in Asia, not just Southeast Asia—and that 20% of al Qaeda's total 
membership is located in Asia. But how much is located in Pakistan, South Asia, and Southeast 
Asia is not clear. Broome noted there is a very large Islamic community which ranges in its views 
from very moderate to extreme, adding that schools in Indonesia were used for the Bali bomber 
recruitment, and that there's evidence of people from the southern Philippines as well. But for 
how much of this we've got connections, and therefore a linkage, for another area to expand 
influence, Broome said we don't know, adding we don't even know how the money is getting 
around the region, let alone if it's heading out of the region, because so much moves informally 
throughout the region. 
 
In between sessions, discussions continued over coffee.  
Panel VI: U.S. Domestic and International Responses to Terrorist Financing 
Jeff Larsen, founder and principal of the Larsen Consulting Group, chaired the afternoon panel on 
U.S. domestic and international responses to terror financing. He introduced panel members, and 
the first to present was Anne Clunan, Assistant Professor on the NPS faculty, who earned her 
doctorate from U.C. Berkeley.  
1. Anne Clunan, Assistant Professor, Naval Postgraduate School—U.S. and International 
Responses to Terrorist Financing 
Clunan explained that she would be taking an IR theory perspective, and ask three basic 
questions, including, is there a counter international terrorist financing scheme? Can it be 
enforced? She noted that the IR tradition posits that power is essential, and as such you need a 
hegemon to lead states to make any international regime effective. As to her first question, yes—
there is in fact a counter terrorism finance regime, but what it really is a money laundering regime 
in different clothes. Consequently, there is a normative structure in place, emerging from the 
nascent anti money laundering regime, and this money laundering regime is a necessary but not 
a sufficient part of the effort to struggle against terrorism. Clunan noted a strategy to change the 
environment in which terrorists operate is not the solution, but has to be part of the solution. She 
added that the U.S. has led the effort after 9/11, and also before 9/11 when it was a counter-drug 
and counter-money laundering effort. Were the U.S. not willing to underwrite or lead the regime, 
this would, from an IR theory perspective, be problematic for effectiveness of the regime. Clunan 
also noted the War in Iraq has had a tremendous impact, particularly the scandal at Abu Ghraib, 
which has had a negative impact on the cooperation of Middle Eastern states.  
She recalled how in preceding presentations that we already heard a lot of these best practices 
aren't particularly effective as they are not targeted at terrorist financing, with UN resolutions 1267 
passed in 1999 aimed at al Qaeda and the Taliban; and resolution 1373, which the UN passed 
after 9/11 which established an international mini-treaty requiring state action against all terrorist 
organizations and their associated. She noted Victor Comras talked about the 1267 committee, or 
as it is known, the al Qaeda/Taliban committee, and efforts to target terrorist financing before and 
particularly after 9/11—adding that Resolution 1373 was supposed to be that—and supposed to 
be the committee after 9/11 to get everyone onboard to create a counter-terrorist strategy as it 
legislated a mandate to freeze the assets of terrorists and broadly defined terrorists, not just al 
Qaeda and the Taliban. But she noted that the U.S. is not leading it, and not aggressively active 
in it, and this has really hampered the ability of that committee to become the focal point of any 
international regime to handle. Further, Clunan noted there remain problems of definitions, and 
noted the Russians are working with UN to create a new consolidated terror list, adding that 
there's still not a lot of agreement around the world on what is a terrorist, and what is an insurgent.  
Clunan also recalled the Egmont Group's process for creating FIUs, and noted how after 9/11, it 
became very sexy for a state to create a financial intelligence unit, and from a small number of 
Egmont FIUs, the total as of June 23, 2004 had risen to 94 in just two years—and these have 
been useful for information sharing, though they have not shown to be a central part of the anti-
money laundering scheme. And, so far, we have not seen a lot of results yet, and it's too early to 
see how effective they become. And, in the private sector, she noted that since 1999 the 
Welkspur Principles require companies to execute due diligence to make sure it does not 
facilitate money laundering and—after 9/11—terrorism financing. These informal international 
bodies have enjoyed substantial and important movement, but the U.S. has not supported the 
UN's Counter-Terrorism Committee and has been unwilling to underwrite a formal counter-
terrorist financing regime. Clunan observed overall that what we see with regards to a regime is 
that there is really no core, and that the U.S. is not putting a lot of finances into it, apart from 
some bilateral assistance from the State Department side, but in total since 9/11 there's been 
only $21 million spent, which is not a lot of money if you think about the amount of technical 
assistance that is needed worldwide to set up a counter-terrorism financing regime. She observed 
that $136 million has been frozen—$36 million inside the U.S., and that 100 countries have anti-
money laundering legislation. As well, she noted 188 countries have the legal authority to freeze 
al Qaeda assets and Taliban assets; 170 countries can freeze terrorism assets in general; 117 
states are now party to the terrorist financing convention, which was signed in 1999 but did not go 
into force until 2002. So, with all this activity, Clunan observed it looks like a lot happened—but 
looks can be deceiving, and it's been mostly adapting money laundering methods, and so far not 
a lot of implementation is in force.  
Clunan asked, do states have the capacity to enforce the laws we're talking about? She added, Is 
it within a state's capacity—not just its bureaucratic ability—to communicate with each other, 
which is important to do, and also to demonstrate its political capacity to act? She noted how the 
banking industry prior to 9/11 refused to cooperate with such efforts, and in other countries. 
various domestic constituencies such as charities in Saudi Arabia, proved largely uncooperative.  
Another thing, commented Clunan, is how tremendously complex it is to coordinate many 
different agencies within a country, as there are dozens, and this can be a tremendously complex 
problem which means states which don't have a lot of domestic capacity, which we call 'weak 
states,' are going to have an incredibly hard time. Indeed, even in best case, the U.S., we're 
having a hard time, and is lacking the domestic capacity to coordinate across agencies, which is 
something very critical that we do—and which we need extremely high level of priority to make 
this happen, and to break down those walls, we need to change an organizational culture of 
government from 'need to know' to 'need to share.'  
Clunan reiterated that the U.S. is the best case in terms of capacity, as it has lots of power, and 
the President can designate people under the terms of the PATRIOT ACT. She explained 
capacity is different from power, and that having capacity means dealing with bureaucratic battles, 
public interests, private interests. She observed that resources and priorities given to 
counterterrorism financing waxes and wanes with terrorist attacks, peaking after the attacks of 
1993, 1998, 2001, with much better coordination in the U.S. since 9/11, but she noted there is 
concern that that willingness to act together is eroding over time as bureaucratic forces start to 
act again. In other countries, Clunan noted, Only the domestic experience of a terrorist attack is 
going to galvanize other states such as Pakistan, India and the Philippines to actually enforce 
anti-terrorism financing, and unfortunately only such a shock will galvanize a reactive reaction.  
2. Raphael Perl, Congressional Research Service—9/11 Commission Report & Terror 
Financing: Implications for U.S. Policymakers 
Raphael Perl, a specialist on international terrorism policy with the Congressional Research 
Service, noted that in the war on terror, the man with the money is just as dangerous as the man 
with the gun, but speculated that maybe to some degree the man carrying the anti-terrorism 
financing banner is wearing the emperor's new clothes. Perl wonders, where and how this money 
fits into the terrorist's equation—how important is it to the terrorists? And where and how the 
financing should fit into our equation, how important is it, and how important should it be? How do 
we de-compartmentalize the issue and better integrate it into policy? Perl said his presentation 
would briefly look at antiterrorism financing strategy, what it says—and more important what it 
doesn't say and then conclude by looking at where terrorism financing policy is going, or should 
be going, and at what policy issues the 9/11 commission raises—and promises. Perl broadly 
considers four questions that emerge in the wake of the 9/11 commission report's release: on 
what assumptions should policy be based; what should the goals and objectives of policy be; how 
does one measure success or failure of policy implementation; and what specific policy options 
may hold promise of success?  
In 2003, anti-terrorism strategy was defined by the Bush Administration to include four pillars: 
defeating, denying, diminishing and defending. He added that these pillars include a pre-emptive 
network destabilizing strategy that emphasizes the need to attack terrorist groups and deny them 
support, and he notes a subset of that is to attack terrorist finances and deny financing support 
for terrorist groups—which is heavily oriented toward international law enforcement cooperation, 
and terrorism financing cooperation is an important part of this strategy.  
Perl noted the 9/11 Commission Report made 41 recommendations—and that one deals with 
terrorism financing, advising that vigorous efforts to track terrorism financing must be maintained, 
and praises the success we've had gathering intelligence on terror operations and the success 
we had arresting key financiers. The 9/11 Commission thus presented a report card, and looks at 
what we've done—and where we've failed. If you look at the text you will see it suggests a 
redefining of our strategy goals away from our focus on seizing money to gathering intelligence 
and that three factors are important. He noted it can be like trying to catch one kind of fish by 
draining the ocean, and that terrorists seek informal mechanisms for transporting money, which 
makes it harder to track. He added that the U.S. government made little leeway deciphering al 
Qaeda funding channels, and that his observation is that as terrorist network become increasing 
decentralized, they become increasingly self-supporting.  
This shatters the assumption that we can significantly decrease terrorism financing, and that this 
will reduce terrorist action, but after a period of time, policy begins to shift to incorporate new 
assumptions, and as such, I would suggest the commission report opens the door to a more 
holistic comprehensive approach to terror financing, within a broader context than just seizing 
assets and to thus gain strategic or tactical intelligence; to foster international coalition building—
which should be a primary objective; to reduce international crime, which should be a goal, and I 
disagree with Nikos [Passas] on that; to deterring individuals and organizations from financing 
terrorist causes; to disrupting organizations and forcing them to devote more time to logistical 
support than conducting operations; and lastly, to create legal tools to bring to bear on operations.  
Perl discussed ways of measuring success, and noted he presents lots of them in my paper, but 
in his presentation, for the purpose of time, would focus on two, including the impact of policies 
on coalition building, and our policy options if we factor in the observations and recommendations 
of the 9/11 commission. With just seven minutes left in his presentation, Perl explained that 
increasingly, terrorist financing is compared to a hydra and if you cut one head off, two grow back, 
and to work against this, Perl believes that Congress, to develop a viable strategy, should focus 
not just on money but on the demand driving the money, and added we need to facilitate the 
channeling of contributions to non-jihadist causes. He added our job is to seek to identify 
organizations that are terrorist funded, those who give, and as well, we must identify those that 
aren't.  
Perl believes we need to be careful not to let the pendulum swing in the other direction, such as 
to follow not freeze the money—and joked about how this parallels the swings in air temperature 
of the conference all, noting the morning was freezing, the afternoon boiling, while neither 
appeared effective to me. Perl took a pragmatic approach, to try to fix stuff, noting there's not 
enough effort on interdicting, and believes that even a small amount of funding interdicted can 
derail terrorist operations. Perl explained that it's important to recognize the limitations of policy to 
limit terrorism financing and while drying up funds can have an important impact on terror 
organizations' ability to recruit and operate, that it will do little to deter suicide bombers. Better 
that we have policies that restrict compensation to families of suicide bombers, as that could have 
an impact, or that restrict educational systems imbued with hatred and bigotry which can fuel 
terrorism. Perl believes that we need to work with people in the Islamic world willing to work with 
us here, and that we need to consider civil liberties. At the same time, he said I would suggest to 
you that it's not the avowed policy of our government to defend freedom abroad while restricting 
at home; but at same time, I think we have to be vigilant here.  
In closing, Perl said I would suggest to you that the 9/11 report has created an environment open 
and conducive to the discussion of terrorism policy, and that many suggest the time is ripe for the 
Executive Branch to sit down with experts to re-evaluate where their effort to counter terrorism 
financing has gone, and should be going. He added, Our assumptions have turned upside down 
and we need to sit down and evaluate these things. He believes that conferences like this can 
provide important input and impact, and that in terms of terrorism financing, these are historic 
times. We are looking at our policy, reevaluating it, and because of this it is an ideal time for 
people at this conference to make a contribution.  
3. LT COL Darryl Williams, StratCom, Omaha—JFHQ-IO Transformation Division 
The final presentation of this panel and the conference was made by Lt. Darryl Williams, from 
StratCom. He discussed a new program called the Partnership To Defeat Terrorism (PTDT). 
Williams explained that terrorists don't have their own processes but instead overlay on other 
processes. He added that we realized very quickly in the Defense Department, at State, Treasury 
and a few other places—that we don't have the expertise, since most of these global processes 
that terrorists use are owned privately, so to penetrate them, the counter-terrorism community in 
government must develop trusted relationships with think tanks, academia, private business. 
PTDT convened a meeting of global process leaders—in November 2003 including the global 
leaders from energy, telecom, academia, government, and brought them together to start to look 
at the problem—and to develop a new paradigm.  
PTDT thus decided to take lessons from the emergence of the U.S. Federal Reserve, that quasi-
governmental entity that is independent of, but exists at the pleasure of, the U.S. government. 
PTDT thus aims to create what Williams described as a Federal Security Reserve System—a 
national board that doesn't fit under Homeland Security but instead looks globally. As part of the 
PTDT's plan of attack, Williams said the project will assess part public/private partnerships, and 
consider a regional-specific architecture similar to the FEMA model, noting that every region has 
a predominant industry that is global in nature, to take a lead in that particular strength. As well, 
Williams thinks PTDT will prove useful in counter-terror operations, since it can take unclassified 
analysis and bring it back, and see if it correlates with the chatter. PTDT will provide top strategic 
decision-makers with the only industry/academia information-sharing partnership that looks at all 
areas of national power, and will provide StratCom with unprecedented access to global industry 
and academia leaders, and once we get the chatter to them, Williams expects that we will get 
information going.  
4. Discussion and Question Period 
Panel discussant David Mares, a professor of political science from the University of California, 
San Diego and adjunct professor at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific 
Studies, started off by observing, I really enjoyed that last presentation as it sounds fascinating 
and encouraging after everything we heard the last couple of days. He added, I enjoyed both of 
these papers presented prior to Darryl Williams' presentation, and learned a lot from both of these 
papers.  
A question period followed. One participant asked Perl, were you advocating an international list 
of approved charities? Perl noted it's very difficult for governments to do that, as there are a lot of 
legal problems there—but I do think it is possible to work with the Islamic community to come up 
with a list they recommend, or maybe a vetting process, or a transparency policy—though he 
noted charities don't like transparency since a lot of money doesn't go to the charity, such as an 
expensive lunch or company car. He added that we hypothetically could get the Saudi 
government to say their list of favorite charities. Phil Williams asked Perl about his three measure 
of success, and Perl replied one measure of success is: could this be achieved somehow at a 
lesser cost, and another measure of success is the impact on terrorism recruitment, as 
recruitment is very, very important and is a very important indicator. Perl believes that a model to 
measure this could be developed—and this could be an effective measurement of success in the 
war on terror. He added that we need to figure out a way to measure that momentum and to 
measure, is our public getting fired up? He added that we must given them realistic expectations. 
Another attendee asked Perl to address state terrorism, noting they had heard some 
contradictory opinions of state sponsorship of terrorism and wondering if there was any real data 
of state sponsorship? Perl reflected, if you encourage incitement, and facilitate incitement, is that 
sponsorship of terrorism? I tend to think it is. But, he added, in terms of looking the other way, he 
observed then clearly countries like Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran could be doing more to prevent 
terror activities.  
Another participant observed, :since the day it was created, I've been wondering whether the 
Department of Homeland Security was a help or hindrance in the war on terror, noting I've 
worked with parts of the Department of Homeland Security on border stuff, and all I see are 
ramped up internal squabbles that are diverting resources away from homeland security. The 
participant next asked, What can we learn about the reorganization of national security with the 
creation of DoD after World War II? Darryl Williams responded, noting it's going to take years 
before it is fully developed, and whether we've learned our lesson, he said, No, look at testimony 
on creating counter terrorism financing. When it comes to sharing information among U.S. 
agencies, the feeling in the U.S. government is that anytime you bring in private industry, you 
open yourself up to legal problems, and so forth, so the tendency is to feel like a leper colony. He 
added that there's this mentality on both sides to isolate, and until legislation is crafted smartly, 
until the populace is educated on what's going to be done—it's going to be tough. Perl responded 
that the Department of Energy could also be an interesting model, and added that every 
organization has a startup time, and based on past experience with newly emerging agencies, at 
best DHS can be fully operational in 3-5 years—but until then, it will be like a Kabuki dance—with 
people bumping into each other. He added, My feeling with 9/11 Commission is that it focused on 
organizational failures but in actual fact, I see a lot of personnel or individual failures—and one of 
the potential problems with organizations like DHS is that they may not get the best people in the 
leadership positions, since the best people might be staying in the other agencies and not going 
over to DHS unless assigned to leadership positions, and this is one caveat that could have a big 
impact on DHS in the future, and until we know how it works out in our own country, we should be 
cautious and not too push too hard on other countries. 
Panel VII: Author’s Roundtable and Policy Recommendations 
At the end of the question period, panel chair Jeff Larsen thanked the panelists, the discussant 
and the participants for their contributions to the discussion. Conference co-organizer Harold 
Trinkunas announced that an Author Panel would follow—and that after taking potshots at each 
other the last couple of days it was now their turn to take potshots at project organizer. The 
panelists who had presented papers remained in the conference hall after the other participants 
departed, where they discussed the forthcoming book on counter-terrorism financing. Trinkunas 
re-introduced the chair of the last panel, Jeff Larsen, principal of Larsen Consulting Group, who 
will be serving as managing editor of the book, who discussed his role, and the editing guidelines, 
schedule and process he would be following. After Larsen's presentation of editorial guidelines 
and processes to the authors, and the author brainstorming session, Trinkunas closed by 
thanking the participants, adding, "You made us all look really good."  
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